This article examines the position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians from the Dutch colonial period to the post-Suharto era and analyses the factors that shaped their position. This article will focus on the' position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians in the aspects of economy, sociocultural sphere and politics. Under Dutch colonial rule, which began in the seventeenth century, the colonial regime enforced the divide-and-rule policy that deterred the interactions between the Chinese and the indigenous population. The Dutch allowed the Chinese to form ethnic-based organisations, establish Chinese-language presses and open Chinese-medium schools as they wanted the Chinese to maintain their "Chinese-ness" in order to keep them as a distinct ethnic group. Moreover, the Dutch used the Chinese instead of the indigenous 1 .r " -population to fill most economic niches in order to prevent the rise of an indigenous merchant class that might challenge their position. This had further widened the economic disparity between the Chinese and the indigenous people. During the Sukarno years (1950)(1951)(1952)(1953)(1954)(1955)(1956)(1957)(1958)(1959)(1960)(1961)(1962)(1963)(1964)(1965), the Chinese continued to enjoy freedom to establish and operate Chinese organisations, Chineselanguage presses and Chinese-medium schools because Sukarno was close to China and hence was relatively tole;ant to the Chinese in Indonesia. The Chinese were also allowed to actively getting involved in politics. However, the Sukarno regime introduced a few discriminatory policies to reduce Chinese economic interests and assist indigenous businesspeople. During the Suharto's rule , due to the anti-communist politics associated with the Cold War, the Suharto regime perceived the ethnic Chinese as the potential 'fifth column' for China and introduced forced assimilation policies to curtail Chinese culture as well as control the Chinese. The Chinese were also discouraged from actively getting involved in politics and were only given opportunities to get involved in business activities. In the post-Suharto era (1998-present) 
Introduction
The ethnic Chinese have always been a small minority in Indonesia. In 1930 they represented an estimated 2.03 per cent of the total population (Ananta et al., 2008, p. 20) . It was estimated that Chinese Indonesians formed about 1.2 per cent of the total Indonesian population in both 2000 and 2010 (Ananta et al., 2008, p. 23, Ananta et al., 2013, p. 14, Table 2 ).1 Despite their small proportion in the country, it has been widely acknowledged that ethnic Chinese Indonesians have played an important and vital role in the economic development of Indonesia. However, it is also undeniable that nowhere have more ethnic
Chinese been discriminated and persecuted during the past centuries than in Indonesia.
Various discrimination and attacks against the Chinese had already taken place during Dutch colonisation. The discrimination against the Chinese was most severe during Suharto's presidency (1966 Suharto's presidency ( -1998 as the state imposed forced assimilation upon them, coercing them to abandon their ethnic and cultural identities, but at the same time still stigmatising them as Chinese and restricting them from politics, public service, military and entrance to public universities. Furthermore, attacks against the Chinese reached its climax in May 1998 amid the Asian financial crisis when riots against the Chinese broke out in many parts of the country especially Medan, Jakarta and Solo. It was even alleged that many Chinese women were brutally tortured, raped and murdered. Suharto' s rule ended amid the financial crisis when he resigned on 21 May 1998. Ironically, the post-Suharto era saw the significant improvement in the condition and position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians.
This article examines the position of ethnic Chinese Indonesians from the Dutch colonial period to the post-Suharto era. This article looks at major literature on Chinese Indonesians to identify the factors that shaped their position in the aspects of economy, sociocultural sphere and politics.
Pre-colonial Period and Dutch Colonial Rule
The economically privileged position of Chinese Indonesians is largely due to historical factors. The Chinese were already residents in Java and coastal communities of the Maluku Islands, Sulawesi, Sumatra and Kalimantan before the arrival of the Dutch. The
Chinese settled in the Indonesian archipelago for trading purposes (Reid, 1993; Sidel, 2006, p. 19 ). Many local regents appointed Chinese merchants as intermediary traders between themselves, the indigenous population, and external markets. These local regents preferred the Chinese to the indigenous population to fill this occupational niche in order to prevent the rise of an indigenous merchant class that might challenge their position (Reid, 1992, p. 497) .
In pre-colonial times, the Chinese in Java and other parts of Southeast Asia could assimilate into the indigenous population, because increasingly numbers of those who traveled to Southeast Asia for trade were themselves Muslim (Wertheim, 1965, pp. 46-47; Chua, 2008, p. 31; Skinner, 1996, p. 55; Anderson, 1998, p. 321; Lembong, 2008, p. 48) .
Under Dutch colonial rule, which began in the seventeenth century, the Chinese could no longer be completely assimilated into the indigenous society. According to Mona Lohanda (1996, p. 1) , in the days of the Dutch East India Company (VOC) during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the people in the Indonesian archipelago were classified into Christians and non-Christians and on a racial basis, westerners (Europeans) and non-westerners (nonEuropeans). Each non-western ethnic group was ruled by local headmen appointed by the VOC. All Chinese from different speech groups (e.g. Hokkien, Hakka and Hainan) were 4 classified as Chinese. The headman of the Chinese community in each locality was known as 'Kapitan Cina' (Chinese captain) (Lohanda, 1996) . Like the local regents before them, the VOC used the Chinese as middlemen between the Dutch and the indigenous population (Suryadinata, 1988, p. 262; Chua, 2008, p. 31; Hoadley, 1988) . After the collapse of the VOC , in 1800, its territories were taken over by the Dutch colonial government. In 1854, the colonial government divided the population of the Dutch East Indies into three groups (Govaars, 2005, p. 20) . The first group was European who formed the upper level. The middle level was Foreign Orientals, which included the Chinese, Arabs, Indians and Japanese who were born in the Dutch East Indies or had resided there for 10 years or above. The bottom level was the indigenous population (Suryadinata, 1993b, p. 83; Shiraishi & Shiraishi, 1993, p. 8) . According to The Siauw Giap (1967, p. 91) , it was this stratification which made Islam less attractive to the Chinese, because Muslims were considered indigenous people with a status inferior to that of the Chinese.
Under Dutch rule, Chinese businesspeople became indispensable to the colonial economy. The colonial government granted Chinese licenses to engage in "the selling of opium, the operation of gambling establishments, ferries, pawnshops, and abattoirs, and the gathering of birds' nests for export to the gourmets of China" (Williams, 1960, p. 24) . Such a monopoly concession system was known as revenue or tax farming and the license holder was known as a revenue farmer (Govaars, 2005, p. 27; Williams, 1960, p. 25) . Among all monopoly concessions the opium concession was the most lucrative (Govaars, 2005, p. 28) . 2 The monopoly concession system produced many wealthy Chinese revenue farmers.
In order to prevent the Chinese and the indigenous people from combining forces to challenge them, the Dutch introduced zoning and pass systems in 1835 and 1863, respectively, that required the Chinese to reside in restricted areas and prevented them from travelling out of these areas unless they had passes (Suryadinata, 1993b, pp. 81-82) . These systems effectively prevented the Chinese fromliving 'among the indigenous population and restricted interaction between the Chinese and other ethnic groups. Moreover, according to Leo Suryadinata, the zoning system "had a far-reaching impact on the 'separateness' of the Chinese" (Suryadinata, 1993b, p. 82 ). The Chinese therefore began to occupy an ambivalent position in Indonesian society during Dutch rule. On the one hand, they played a crucial role in the colony's economic development. On the other hand, the Chinese began to be perceived as the "Other" because of this and were increasingly regarded with suspicion and prejudice by the indigenous majority.
In the 1890's Dutch humanitarians pressured the Dutch colonial government to abolish the revenue farming system, since they saw it as detrimental to the welfare of the indigenous population (Williams, 1960, pp. 25-27) . This move broke part of the Chinese economic power. The Chinese in Indonesia were also further angered when, in 1899, after the defeat of China in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Dutch government acceded to the Japanese government request to classify the Japanese in the Dutch East Indies as Europeans (Fasseur, 1994, p. 37) . Although the Chinese also demanded equal status with Europeans, the Dutch rejected this demand as the colonial government was concerned that the concession would exert a considerable impact on the growing nationalist forces among indigenous Indonesians.' As Mona Lohanda (1996) notes:
Considering the turbulent political circumstances of the colony, particularly from the first decade of the twentieth century, the Dutch were very cautious in their handling of Chinese affairs. Yielding to the Chinese request for equal status would provoke anti-Chinese feeling among the Indonesians, which in turn might endanger the Dutch themselves.
(p. 151)
At the same time, political events in China stimulated the nationalist sentiments of the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies. China had been invaded by foreign powers in the nineteenth century, losing in the Opium War (1840-1842) to the British and suffering an immense defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). After the Boxer Uprising in 1900, Beijing was invaded and plundered by the allied armies, an alliance of the armies of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) (Govaars, 2005, p. 49) .4 As Ming Govaars (2005) remarks, "The division of China into foreign concessions and spheres of influence threatened to make it 'a kind of international colony'" (p. 49). Two prominent Chinese political leaders, K'ang Yu-wei (Jlif 79) and Sun Yat-sen (f!J\~1w/*J\9=t LiJ), sought to rescue China "while living in exile among the overseas Chinese" (Govaars, 2005, p. 49) . K'ang was a reformist while Sun was a revolutionary. The Chinese in the Dutch East Indies, who had suffered great loss of prestige, could identify with the difficulties of China and offered financial support to both K'ang and Sun with the hope to "contribute to the future greatness of their ancient homeland" (Govaars, 2005, p. 49) . In addition, the lifting of the prohibition of Chinese emigration by the Manchu government (Qing Dynasty) in 1894 and the issuance of the Chinese law of nationality in 1909 which was based on jus sanguinis and claimed that every legal or extra-legal child of Chinese father or mother would be considered a Chinese citizen, regardless of birthplace further strengthened the nationalist sentiments of the Chinese in the Indonesian archipelago (Govaars, 2005, p. 50; Willmott, 1961, p. 14) .5
These various factors contributed to the Pan-Chinese Movement in the Dutch East Indies, which revolted against the restrictions placed on the Chinese, particularly the zoning and pass systems. 'Pan-Chinese Movement' is a term used by scholars such as Lea E. Williams (1960) , Leo Suryadinata (1981) and Ming Govaars (2005) the Siang Hwee (Chinese Chamber of Commerce) that championed the interests of Chinese business and community; and the Soe Po Sia (Chinese reading club) which disseminated modem political ideas through the distribution of reading materials (Williams, 1960, pp. 54-113; Kwee, 1969, pp. 1-21; Govaars, 2005, pp. 58-61; Suryadinata, 1981, pp. 5-6 (Suryadinata, 1981, pp. 5-6, 21) .6 In order to curb Chinese nationalism, and placate the Pan-Chinese movement, the colonial government passed a nationality law in 1910 based on jus soli which declared that all persons born in the Indies of parents residing there were Dutch subjects even if not Dutch citizens (Willmott, 1961, p. 15) . Thus, the Indies-born Chinese were both Chinese 5 Previously, the Manchu government prohibited the emigration of Chinese and those returning to China from abroad were subjected to death penalty. For more details on this policy, see Lim (1967, p. 63) and Chong (1983/84, p. 3) . 6 Sin Po later published its Chinese-language edition, known asXin Bao, in 1921 (Suryadinata, 1997, p. 254 (Suryadinata, 1981, pp. 10-11) .
Takashi Shiraishi (1997, pp. 187-207) , however, argues that these systems restricting Chinese movement and residence were abolished because the Dutch saw that anti-Sinicism was already firmly in place among indigenous Indonesians in the early 1910s as a result of the rise of new nationalist politics that emphasised racial distinctions. Hence, it was no longer necessary to require Chinese and indigenous people to reside in different quarters. In fact, the abolishment of both systems in the late 1910s did not bring significant improvement in interactions and relations between the Chinese and the indigenous population. Many pribumi (indigenous people) perceived the Chinese as foreigners who were culturally different from the indigenous population.! They also believed that the Chinese were economically strong but exclusive and selfish (Suryadinata, 1993b, p. 78; Coppel, 1983, p. 5) .
It should be noted that the political orientation of the Chinese was never homogeneous. Apart from the pro-China Chinese, there were also pro-Dutch and proIndonesian Chinese during the Dutch colonial period. The pro-Dutch Chinese were represented by Chung Hwa Hui (CHH), a Chinese organisation founded by wealthy Chinese businessmen while the pro-Indonesian Chinese were represented by the Indonesian Chinese Party (PTI-Partai Tionghoa Indonesia), a Chinese political party that supported the Indonesian natiorialist movement. Nevertheless, PTI was never a strong party as it was not supported by wealthy Chinese businessmen who were mostly pro-Dutch. The party was also not regarded as an Indonesian party by the Indonesian nationalist movement (Suryadinata, 1981) .9
In addition, the Dutch allowed the Chinese to establish Chinese-language newspapers.
Most of such newspapers were managed by totok Chinese, i.e. pure-blood Chinese who were born in China and migrated to the Indies (Huang, 2005, p. 390) . In fact, it can be said that the Dutch allowed the Chinese to form ethnic-based organisations, establish Chinese-language presses and open Chinese-medium schools because they wanted the Chinese to maintain their "Chinese-ness" in order to keep them as a distinct ethnic group and prevent them from mingling with the indigenous population.
The loyalty of the Chinese to the Indies was also doubted by many pribumi. Before independence, the Chinese were often suspected of allying with the Dutch and China (Dawis, 2009, p. 2) . Such stereotypes and prejudice manifested in anti-Chinese violence that broke out in Tangerang, Jakarta, Bandung, Pontianak, Palembang, Bagan Siapi-Api and Medan during the early phase of the Revolution (1945 Revolution ( -1946 (Somers, 1965, pp. 110-119; Heidhues, 1974, pp. 101-102, 109; Cribb, 1991, pp. 53; 111) . Many Chinese traders were attacked because they were deemed as rivals of indigenous small businesses. Some Chinese were caught in the riots because they were suspected of being in league with the Dutch (Heidhues, 1974, p. 109; Hoon, 2008, 33) .
The Sukarno Years (1950-1965)
After independence, some indigenous leaders assumed that the Chinese were oriented to China instead of Indonesia (Dawis, 2009, p. 2) . Many Chinese in Indonesia, especially those who were recent immigrants, had a strong sense of pride in China (Coppel, 1983, p. 26 ). The victory of the communists in China in 1949 triggered Chinese nationalism among 9 For more details on the origins and development ofCHH and PTl, see Suryadinata (1981, pp. 39-84) .
Chinese Indonesians and prompted some Chinese Indonesians to return to China to receive further Chinese-language education and to build their ancestral land (Godley, 1989; Hui, 2011, pp. 98-99) . In the eyes of some indigenous Indonesian leaders, the Chinese minority was oriented toward China, They therefore perceived the Chinese minority as a potential 'fifth column' for China (Suryadinata, 1992, p. 167) .10They were therefore uncomfortable with the dual citizenship of the Chinese that emerged again out of the relatively liberal the
Citizenship Act of 1946 and the Round Table Agreement on Citizenship in 1949 between
Indonesia and the Netherlands. Under these provisions, those Chinese who had been Dutch subjects and did not reject Indonesian citizenship were considered as citizens of both Indonesia and China (Hoon, 2008, p. 33) . For many indigenous nationalists, as Hoon ChangYau (2008) puts it, "dual nationality meant that the political loyalty of the Chinese must be divided between Indonesia and China" (p. 34). Moreover, during the 1955 Bandung AsianAfrican Conference, China abandoned its traditional claim that all ethnic Chinese were Chinese citizens (Suryadinata, 1992, p. 171) . Both President Sukarno and the Chinese prime minister, Zhou Enlai (.mJ J~t*),agreed that ethnic Chinese should choose only one citizenship (Liu, 2011, pp. 177-179) . Hence, in 1958, a new and less liberal citizenship act known as "Act No. 62 of the year 1958 Concerning Republic of Indonesia Citizenship" was passed (Willmott, 1961, p. 118) . Under the new act, Chinese in Indonesia would lose their citizenship if they did not submit an official statement abjuring Chinese citizenship (Willmott, 1961, p. 120; Hoon, 2008, p. 34) . However, the act was only fully implemented in 1960, thus leaving the citizenship of most Chinese in an ambiguous state between 1958 and 1960 (Hoon, 2008, p. 35) . In November 1959, as part of the steps towards reducing the economic role of ethnic Chinese, the government issued the Presidential Decree No. 10 that banned "alien" (i.e. Chinese) retail trade in rural areas and required all the aliens to transfer their business to Indonesian citizens by January 1, 1960 (Badan Koordinasi Masalah Cina= BAKIN, 1979 . Although the decree was officially only directed at Chinese without Indonesian citizenship, in reality, those with Indonesian citizenship encountered similar distress as the distinction between citizens and aliens was still unclear (Hoon, 2008, p. 35) . In West Java alone, 9,927 Chinese were forced to move from rural areas to urban places (Huang, 2000, p. 19 ). There were also Chinese who were sent back to China. According to.. Thee Kian Wie (2006, p. 88) , around 119,000 Chinese citizens were repatriated to China during 1960-1961. Some chose to leave for China because they thought that the Presidential Decree had threatened their livelihood (Mackie, 1976, p. 95) .
Earlier in April 1950, the Sukarno government implemented the "Benteng" (Fortress) programme which gave priority to indigenous businesspeople to engage in import-export business and prohibited the Chinese from getting involved in such business (Thee, 2006, p. 80 ). However, instead of fostering a strong and self-reliant indigenous business class, the programme "resulted in the emergence of the 'Ali Baba' system in which Chinese Indonesians used indigenous Indonesians as 'front men' or 'sleeping partners'" (Lembong, 2008, p. 50 ). The programme eventually came to an end in the second half of the 1950s (Thee, 2006, p. 84) .
Although the Sukarno government introduced the above discriminatory policy to reduce Chinese economic interests and assist indigenous businesspeople, it allowed ethnic Chinese to form ethnic-based organisations (ranging from cultural associations to clan groups to business chambers), establish Chinese-language presses, open Chinese-medium schools, and be involved in politics (Pandiangan, 2003, pp. 410-412; Suryadinata, 1992, pp. 149-153; 1993, 86-88; 1997, pp. 253-259) . In fact, in the new parliament elected in the 1955 election, which was the first national election held in Indonesia after independence, nine appointed seats were reserved for ethnic Chinese (Heidhues, 1974, p. 77) . There were even a few cabinet ministers who were of Chinese origin (Suryadinata., 1992, pp. 14, n10, 14, n l l ; 1993b, p. 88 ). The government allowed the Chinese to keep their ethnic and cultural identities because Sukarno was close to China and hence was relatively tolerant to the Chinese in Indonesia.
It is important to note that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are by no means culturally homogenous. Conventionally, scholars have divided them into peranakan and totok. The peranakan were local-born and acculturated Chinese. Some of them were products of intermarriage between Chinese male immigrants and local indigenous women. They had been residing in Indonesia for centuries. Although the peranakan still identified themselves as Chinese, they had adopted many elements of the majority Indonesian indigenous culture and some of them could not speak Chinese (Skinner, 1958, p. 2; Somers, 1964, p. 4; Hoon, 2008, pp. 4-5) . As mentioned earlier in this article, the totok, on the other hand, were pure-blood Chinese who were born in China and migrated to the Indies. They spoke Chinese and maintained most Chinese customs and cultural traditions. In addition, they were generally more politically oriented to China. According to Leo Suryadinata (1992, p. 90) , the peranakan also used the Hokkien term 'singkeh', meaning 'new guests', to refer to the totok.
Mass Chinese immigration to the Indies took place in the second half of the nineteenth century. The mass immigration was a result of the Taiping Rebellion, a civil war against the Manchu imperial government which began in Guangxi in 1850 and later spread to other provinces. I I The immigrants included a significant number of women and it became possible for Chinese men to marry China-born women rather than indigenous or peranakan women.F 11 For the origins and background of the Taping Rebellion, see Jen (1973) . 12 Prior to the second half of the nineteenth century, there was no female emigration from China to Southeast Asia. This was due to a few factors. First, although the Manchu imperial government officially prohibited the emigration of Chinese, in reality, the regulation was often strictly enforced over the women but not the men. This was because the officials knew that the male emigrants often returned with their savings or had to send money to their families in China, thus allowing the officials to extort money from them. Second, women were accorded very low social status in the traditional Chinese society. The main duty of women was to remain at home to look after their children and parents-in-law. Therefore, they were forced to remain in China. In fact, this special role of Chinese women was manifested in the custom of foot-binding, which forced women to stay Many more Chinese women immigrated to Indonesia after 1900 as a result of the Boxer Uprising in 1900 mentioned earlier in this chapter. Descendants of these new immigrants usually remained culturally totok Chinese and formed the distinct and separate totok community (Somers, 1964, p. 4; Hoon, 2008, p. 5) .
In post-colonial Indonesia during the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese peranakan community was dividedfnto two competing streams. The 'integrationist' group led by the-.
Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship (BAPERKI-Badan Permusjawaratan
Kewarganegaraan Indonesia) fought for citizenship rights for ethnic Chinese and advocated for recognition of a separate Chinese ethnic identity yet one remaining part of the Indonesian nation. This group believed Chinese Indonesians did not need to give up their cultural heritage to fully participate in national politics (Suryadinata, 1992, p. 33; Aizawa, 2011, pp. 49-50; Hoon, 2008, p. 35) . BAPERKI was founded in March 1954 with the aim to promote the understanding of Indonesian citizenship and the elimination of discrimination against ethnic Chinese who were Indonesian citizens (Coppel, 1976, pp. 45-46; Somers, 1964, p. 11; Hoon, 2008, p. 35) . On the other hand, the 'assimilationists' group formed by a number of Chinese peranakan, who were Christians or right wing elements associated with the military, advocated the complete assimilation of the Chinese into the indigenous Indonesian indoors. Third, most of the male emigrants were too poor to bring their families overseas (Lim, 1967, pp. 63-64; Chong, 1983/84, pp. 3-4) . Chinese female immigration to Southeast Asia began only from the latter half of the nineteenth century as some of the hindrances that had earlier prevented them from leaving the country were removed. The immediate factor that prompted Chinese female emigration was the economic and political upheavals in China brought about by the Taiping Rebellion. The chaotic situation in China forced many Chinese women to migrate overseas. Besides that, the contact the Chinese had with the West, as a consequence of the Opium and Arrow Wars in nineteenth century China, played an essential role in eliminating the traditional prejudice the Chinese had against female emigration (For the origins and background of the Opium and Arrow Wars, see Elleman [2001, pp. 3-56] ). The opening of the ''treaty-ports'' in Guangdong and Fujian brought to the increase in the interaction of the Chinese in these two provinces with Europeans. This interaction had resulted in the establishment of several girls' schools by European Christian missionaries. Both Christian and non-Christian female students attended these schools. Apart from their educational work, the Christian missionaries also joined certain Chinese women to fight against the foot-binding custom that discriminated against women. Such efforts had contributed to educational and social advancement of Chinese women, thus removing the traditional prejudice among Chinese against female emigration. Furthermore, in 1860, the Manchu government officially allowed Chinese women to emigrate as wives and dependents of the male emigrants. These factors prompted female emigration from China in the second half of the nineteenth century (Lim, 1967, pp. 72-75; Chong, 1983/84, pp. 5-6). population (Suryadinata, 1992, p. 70; Hoon, 2008, pp. 35-36) . According to Suryadinata (1992, pp. 70-72) , these assimilationists Chinese peranakan included Junus Jahja a.k.a. Lauw
Chuan Tho (~u-1:i!t), an economist; Ong Hok Ham a.k.a. Onghokham (.:Emm~l), a university student; and K. Sindhunatha (.:E *#l I:), a navy captain. The assimilationists were of the opinion that the Chinese needed. to "abandon their cultural background and exclusionary lifestyle -that is, living separately from other Indonesian ethnic groups" in order to eliminate discrimination against them (Aizawa, 2011, p. 49 ).
The Suharto Years (1966-1998)
The anti-Communist violence associated with the Cold War instigated by the Suhartoled military after the military takeover on October 1, 1965 took a strong anti-Chinese tum at times from 1965 to 1968 (Mackie, 1976; Davidson, 2009b, pp. 47-84; Hui, 2011, pp. 115-146; Tsai & Kammen, 2012) .13 Many Chinese in Indonesia were accused of being Communist sympathisers and at least two thousand of them were killed from 1965 to 1966 (Coppel, 1983, p. 58 ). The last and worst major anti-Chinese violence broke out at late 1967 and early 1968 in West Kalimantan. The military provoked Dayaks to murder Chinese who were accused of supporting the communist party (Mackie, 1976, pp. 126-128; Davidson, 2009b, pp. 47-84; Hui, 2011, pp. 115-146) . About two to five thousand Chinese were killed and nearly 100,000 Chinese were relocated to coastal cities and towns such as Pontianak and Singkawang (Davidson, 2009b, pp. 68, 74-77) .14 13 For a comprehensive discussion on the background of the military takeover and the subsequent mass violence against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI-Partai Komunis Indonesia) and the Left, see Kammen and McGregor (2012) . 14 It should be noted that the anti-Communist violence was never anti-Chinese massacres in general, although the massacres that broke out in West Kalimantan in 1967 and 1968 was targeted exclusively at Chinese (see Davidson [2009b, pp. 47-84J for more details on massacres of Chinese in West Kalimantan). There were about half a million people killed in 1965-1966 and the victims were mostly indigenous Indonesians who were members and associates of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKl). Relatively few Chinese were murdered in this period (Cribb & Coppel, 2009 , pp, 447-465; Tsai & Kammen, 2012, pp. 131-155). Prior to its collapse in 1965, the PKl was relatively tolerant of the Chinese minority due to the "anti-racist character of Marxist Later, Suharto's government began to enforce assimilation policies to curtail Chinese culture and control the ethnic Chinese. Public displays of Chinese characters were forbidden.
Ethnic Chinese were not allowed to openly celebrate Chinese holidays or festivals. Ethnic Chinese organisations were banned except those dealing with health, religion, burial services, sports and recreation.P Schools that offered all instruction in Chinese were closed down.
Chinese-language newsp~pers were prohibited, except for one produced by the government.
Furthermore, ethnic Chinese were urged to adopt indigenous-sounding names (Coppel, 1983, p. 165; 2002, pp. 22-23; Suryadinata, 1992, pp. 153-164; Chua, 2008, pp. 39-40) .
It is worth noting that although many Chinese in Indonesia became more During the New Order period, Suharto's regime also issued regulations and decrees that marginalised and stigmatised the Chinese. For instance, a particular code was attached to the national identity cards and passports of Indonesians of Chinese origin (Tan, 1991, p. 123; Aizawa, 2011, pp. 60-61) . This coding system stigmatised the Chinese and "constantly exposed them -to discrimination and exploitation by the bureaucracy, police and military" (Hoon, 2008, p. 39) . Chinese Indonesians also had to produce a Citizenship Letter (SBKRIideology" (McVey, 1968, p. 359 ). The party leaders often stood out against racial attacks on the Chinese minority (Mackie, 1976, p. 79) . 15 Some Chinese organisations therefore converted to charitable foundations (yayasan) that focused on health, religion, burial services, sports or recreation in order to continue to operate. 16 In fact, a lecturer at the University of Indonesia once told me that many people in Jakarta deemed Chinese Indonesians from 'PBBM' (Pontianak, Bangka, Belitung and Medan) as less assimilated and exclusive (personal communication with Timothy (pseudonym), in Indonesian, January 31, 2011).
Sural Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia) to obtain documents such as birth
certificates, passports or marriage certificates (Aizawa, 2011, p. 61 ). In addition, as mentioned earlier in this article, unwritten barriers restricted the Chinese from politics, public service, military and entrance to public universities. During the New Order era, there were , very few ethnic Chinese members of parliament.!? These were Chinese peranakan from the 'assimilationists'
group." As Benedict R. O'G. Anderson (1990) (Setyautama, 2008, p. 410) . But Hasan was adopted by an indigenous Muslim military officer since he was little and had been highly assimilated into indigenous society. Hence, as Li Zhuo Hui (*.$~) (2007, p. 153) , chief editor of Indonesian Chinese-language press Guo Ji Ri Bao ( «00 I$.F B tin )points out, the Chinese community did not perceive Hasan as an "ethnic Chinese businessperson" and did not think he represented the Chinese community.
de-politicised to ensure that the government took better control of any political threat or opposition (Aizawa, 2011, pp. 60-61) . 19 Chua makes a similar argument that such contradictions were meant to ensure that the social and political status of the Chinese, who were economically significant, remained politically weak. Under such circumstances, the Chinese would not be able to challenge the position of the power-holders. This would then secure the social and f~ancial base of the politico-bureaucratic rulers' power (Chua, 2008, pp. 37-38, 41-43) . In other words, the assimilation policies were aimed to secure the power of 
. Mochtar Riady (,$)(iE).
They were all owners of conglomerates (big business groups). The Suharto regime provided protection and various facilities such as privileged access to licenses, contracts and state bank credit to these cukongs. In return, the power elite and their family became the Chinese capitalists' business partners (Robison, 1986, pp. 271-322; Suryadinata, 1997, pp. 33-34) . Many cukongs channelled part of their profits to their political patrons' foundations (yayasan) in the form of 'donations' (Chua, 2008, p. 49) .
However, as Suryadinata has maintained, the number of such cukongs was small and did not represent Chinese Indonesians in general (Suryadinata, 2002b, p. 15 Consequently, the Chinese were exposed to periodic anti-Chinese riots during economic crises (e.g. in 1997-1998) and workers' strikes (e.g. the workers' strike in Medan that took place in 1994) (Purdey, 2006, pp, 77-141; Yang, 2006 Yang, , 2007 Chua, 2008, p. 44) .20Even 20 For the background of the workers' strike in Medan, see Yang (2006, pp. 241-242) .
minor incidents such as traffic accidents, street fights and employer-worker disputes involving Chinese and pribumi could turn into anti-Chinese riots (Dahana, 2004, pp. 48-49) .
In addition, as John T. Sidel (2006) Chinese took place frequently and signified a disturbing trend" (p. 14).22
In summary it can be said that the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies and in the Republic of Indonesia after independence were treated as a "pariah class" (Riggs, 1964 (Riggs, , 1966 Chua, 2008) , powerful in business, but hated for their wealth. They came to be perceived as the "Other" by the indigenous Indonesians. To borrow Fredrik Barth's term (1969, p. 15) , the Chinese and the pribumi came to be separated by an ethnic boundary, that is a social boundary that emerges if an ethnic group maintains its identity when its members interact with outsiders (Barth, 1969, p. 15) . Even though the cultural characteristics within an ethnic group may change and transform, as long as the dichotomisation between members and outsiders persists, the ethnic group will continue to exist (Barth, 1969, p. 14) . It can be said that although the Chinese and the pribumi generally became culturally more similar under Suharto' s forced assimilation, the boundary that separated them was strengthened at the same time. As a result, the Chinese continued to occupy an ambiguous, outsider position in Indonesian society. As Hui Yew-Foong (2011) explains, " [T] he Chinese are strangers in Indonesian society" (p. 15). According to Simmel (1950) , the "stranger" is a person "who comes today and stays tomorrow" (p. 402). He or she is not an 'owner of soil' since he or she is deemed as a stranger by the other (Simmel, 1950, p. 403) .
Post-Subarto Era 11998-Present)
Suharto's authoritarian rule ended in 1998 amid the Asian financial crisis (Suryadinata, 2001, p. 506) . Social unrest in Indonesia, aggravated by the fmancial crisis, escalated and peaked in mid-May in Jakarta, Solo and other parts of the country. Chinese 21 It should be noted that these attacks were fundamentally religious and not ethnic in nature. 22 However, it should be pointed out that during the New Order period, the real upswing of anti-Chinese violence only took place between 1995 and 1998. Violence against the Chinese was fairly minimal prior to that. For an account of violence against the Chinese during the New Order era, see Coppel (1983) ; Mackie (1976, pp. 111-138); Purdey (2006); Yang (2006; .
shops and properties were looted and burned down, and as mentioned earlier, it was alleged that many Chinese women were brutally tortured, raped and murdered (Mackie, 1999, p. 189 ).23According to the Joint Fact-Finding Team (Joint Team) appointed by the Habibie government to investigate the riots, the violence was probably instigated by someone "at the country's 'highest levels' of decision-making" to create a critical upheaval so that martial law could be imposed (The Joint Fact-Finding Team [TGPF] , n.d.). Leo Suryadinata (2001, p. 507) suggests another possible scenario that the violence was an outcome of the internal conflict within the military.i" It has also been argued that the violence was instigated by the military to deflect public anger from the Suharto regime and towards the Chinese minority (Heryanto, 1999, p. 327) . However, to date there is still no concrete evidence available and therefore it is difficult to prove such involvement conclusively.
The fall of Suharto in May 1998 has led to a process of democratisation in Indonesia, with the implementation of a few significant institutional reforms. The period of reform and democratisation after the end of the authoritarian regime was also marked by a considerable decline in anti-Chinese violence after May 1998. John Sidel (2006) attributes the decline of anti-Chinese riots to state-dependent Muslim elites' engagement in straight religious competition, instead of using anti-Chinese violence to assume more political power. Jacques
Bertrand, on the other hand, offers a more comprehensive explanation on the significant decline of anti-Chinese violence. He notes that the killings of May 1998, particularly the alleged mass rape cases, as well as the alleged involvement of the armed forces in the riots, shocked the political elite and Islamic politicians who had been most critical and vocal about Suharto's collusion with Chinese Indonesian big business groups. They began to sympathise 23 However, as Hoon (2008) stated in his published dissertation, the rapes are still "a contested issue as there has been no consensus on the number of rape victims" and ''there is still a general denial of the rapes in Indonesia's official discourse" (p. 46). 24 Suryadinata (2001, p. 507) points to the power struggle between General Prabowo Subianto, Suharto's son-inlaw, and General Wiranto, Suharto appointee. According to this analysis, Prabowo instigated the violence to discredit Wiranto, who was the then Commander of the Armed forces, so that he could seize power from the latter. Abdurrahman Wahid sanctioned the publication of Chinese-language print media through the repealing of laws that had prohibited the local publication of Chinese characters in Indonesia since 1965 and thus Chinese language materials became more freely available. Many schools were allowed to conduct Chinese language courses.P Besides that, ethnic Chinese were allowed to openly celebrate Chinese festivals (Hoon, 2008, p. 104; Giblin, 2003, pp. 347-348) . In fact, in 2002, President Megawati Sukarnoputri announced that the Chinese New year would be a state holiday from 2003 (Freedman, 2003, p. 447 (Suryadinata, 2001, pp. 512-514; Giblin, 2003, pp. 357-358; Hoon, 2008, pp. 77-79 Moreover, since the advent of democratisation, several Chinese Indonesians have taken the initiative to actively participate in political activities and social reform movements to fight for equal rights and an end to discriminatory practices. Hence, the Chinese minority enjoys a less vulnerable political position in the reformasi era.
26 INTI is actually a breakaway faction of PSMTI. PSMTI established itself as an exclusively ethnic Chinese organisation in which only Chinese Indonesians could become full members. Non-Chinese Indonesians could only become honorary members. Some of the original members were uncomfortable with such a policy and had subsequently left to form INTI. INTI accepts all Indonesian citizens who agree with the objective of the organisation to join as members (Giblin., 2003, pp. 357-358; Suryadinata, 2001, pp. 513-514) .
In addition, the rise of China as an economic power also indirectly changed the Indonesians.
In conclusion, the position of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia was shaped by both domestic and external factors. The above discussion indicates that as long as open-minded political leaders are in power and that both Indonesia and China maintain good foreign relations with each other, the Chinese in Indonesia will enjoy a less vulnerable and more secure position.
